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Introduction
Here was a population, low-class and mostly foreign, hanging always 
on the verge of starvation, and dependent for its opportunities of 
life upon the whim of men every bit as brutal and unscrupulous as 
the old-time slave drivers; under such circum stances immorality was 
exactly as inevitable, and as prevalent, as it was under the system  
of chattel slavery. Things that were quite unspeakable went on 
there in the packing houses all the time, and were taken for granted 
by everybody; only they did not show, as in the old slavery times, 
because there was no difference in color between master and slave.
Upton Sinclair, The J ungle
At my place of employment, a busy law firm, the work can be demand­
ing, the hours long and grinding. But it is, in large part, safe and unlikely 
to cause me any physical harm. For sure, lawyers, accountants, and other 
professionals and office workers may suddenly drop dead at their desks 
from aneurysms and ventricular fibrillation, or suffer some less deadly 
and common fate from stress or high blood pressure. But the most often 
reported injury to office workers is musculoskeletal, caused by sitting 
hunched over a keyboard for hours on end, word processing and surfing 
the Internet. After that, office injuries are caused by knocking objects from 
shelves, lifting file boxes, and bumping into open desk drawers. In other 
words, an office is a relatively safe place to work.1 Workers there are un­
likely to die from an explosion or electrocution. Workers in an office are
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unlikely to become fatally ill from exposure to some toxic substance, or 
from the air they breathe at their cubicle.
The same cannot be said for millions of others working in America2 
who take care of us when we are sick, keep us safe in our persons and in 
our homes, build and repair our roads and infrastructure, provide us with 
shelter, teach our children, grow and make our food, sell and serve our 
food, clean our streets and buildings, make our hotel beds, get us from 
one place to the next, assemble our cars, and keep us virtually connected 
to one another. These workers daily affect our lives, often face to face. 
Without them, our lives as we know them today would be unrecognizable. 
The simplest experience of buying milk, eating a steak, or lying down to 
sleep in an upscale hotel room was brought to us unobtrusively and seam­
lessly by someone who risked injury and death in the workplace. Yet most 
Americans give little thought to the real and lurking dangers in the work­
place that their friends, neighbors, and family are exposed to. Instead, we 
are made to fear by politicians and the media much more remote dangers 
in our lives.
The risk of workplace death is much greater than dying in a plane 
crash, or being a victim of a terrorist attack. The odds of dying in a plane 
crash are 1 in 11 million.3 The odds of being killed in a terrorist attack in 
the United States are 1 in 20 million.4 Yet, since 2001, the U.S. govern­
ment has spent more than $1 trillion in antiterrorism measures, excluding 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.5 For these improbable events, we spend 
considerable more time, treasure, and worry than we do about the very 
real and personal risk to, for example, a hotel housekeeper. For workers 
in America, the workplace is a dangerous House of Horrors. Some would 
say it is a jungle.
Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, published in 1906, was dedicated to “the 
Workingmen of America.” It was intended as an expose of the lives and 
working conditions of immigrant workers, with vivid passages describing 
meatpackers falling into rendering vats and being sold for lard. However, 
the immediate reaction to the book had less to do with the safety of the 
meatpackers than with food safety. The public hue and cry from The Jun­
gle produced the passage of the Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food 
and Drug Act of 1906, the predecessor to the Food and Drug Administra­
tion. Comprehensive national legislation protecting worker safety would 
have to wait sixty-four years.
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In the United States today, we have a complex web of federal, state, 
and local laws and regulations that are intended to protect workers from 
harm at their workplaces. But do they really? This regulatory structure 
appears to have meaningful laws and regulations but is left toothless by 
underfunding, the inability to enforce the laws because of a lack of re­
sources, penalties that don’t deter, and by the deliberate underreporting 
of workplace deaths and injuries. The defanging of worker safety laws is 
an act of political negligence brought to American workers by a powerful 
business lobby, spearheaded by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its 
allies. Worker safety laws and regulations are demonized by lobbyists and 
politicians of both parties as job killers, while real flesh-and-blood work­
ers die, are seriously injured, or are exposed to deadly carcinogens every 
day on the job.
As a result, workplace death and injuries occur daily, and in plain view, 
to our loved ones, friends, and neighbors. No longer are worker deaths 
and injuries hidden behind plant gates, protected by armed guards. They 
are occurring right in front of us in public and in seemingly safe work­
places everywhere. No longer are deaths and injuries occurring only to 
workers handling known dangerous equipment or chemicals. Deaths and 
injuries happen to workers in all occupations. Miners, construction work­
ers, oil and gas workers, and railroad workers have always been the poster 
children of workplace death and injury. Their jobs are knowingly danger­
ous. But there is another class of workers—including a growing group of 
millions of service workers—whose jobs may seem benign but can be fa­
tally dangerous. They work in grocery stores, hotels, hospitals, and other 
public places, and the workers there are frequently the most vulnerable in 
the workforce. They are often undocumented, workers of color, women, 
and minimum-wage workers, with little or no benefits and protections. 
Yet these workers are hidden in plain sight because Americans choose not 
to see them, or because we are numbed by our own powerlessness to ef­
fectuate any meaningful change.
In 2015, the last year with complete data at the time of this writing, the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported that 4,836 workers were 
killed on the job, or 13 workers every day. The 2015 fatality rate was 
an increase from 2014, and the highest since 2008. Add to this that the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report that annually 50,000 
deaths are attributed to work-related illnesses—an average of 137 deaths
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each day.6 Do the math. One hundred and fifty workers die each day be­
cause of their work. Compare that to forty-five, which is the total number 
of deaths in the United States since 9/11 that have any tangential relation­
ship to jihad.7
Moreover, as our workforce grows increasingly part-time, the num­
ber of contract workers, or temporary workers, has grown as well. In 
2015, 829 contingent workers died on the job, an increase from 2014, 
accounting for nearly 17 percent of all fatal work injuries. Other ignoble 
highlights from 2015 include a 13 percent increase in fatal injuries among 
women, and 409 workplace homicides. Workplace violence continues 
to be a growing problem, in 2014 causing 26,540 lost-time injuries, and 
women workers suffered 66 percent of lost-time injuries due to workplace 
violence.8 All totaled, in 2015 more workers died in the United States 
from their work than in 2014. As for nonfatal work injuries, the number 
has remained stubbornly flat in recent years. In 2014, more than 3.8 mil­
lion workers reported work-related injuries and illnesses.9 In 2015, the 
incidence rate of nonfatal work injuries requiring days away from work 
to recuperate was only marginally down, from 107.1 cases per 10,000 
full-time workers in 2014 to 104.0 cases in 2015.10 Workplace injuries 
and illnesses are an enormous cost to the American economy of upward 
of $300 billion every year.11
Ten years into the new century, twenty-nine coal miners were killed 
in an explosion at the Massey Energy Upper Big Branch mine in West 
Virginia. It was the worst mine disaster in forty years. That same year, 
the front-page disasters kept coming. The BP/Transocean Gulf Coast oil 
platform exploded, hurling eleven oil platform workers to their deaths 
in burning waters, setting off a calamitous environmental and economic 
disaster.
What can we make of these events and statistics? With more than 
150 million working in the United States, are these acceptable numbers? 
Arguably, the workplace is safer than it has ever been, so isn’t that a good 
thing? Are work injuries just part of the cost of doing America’s business? 
Life is risky, and work is part of life. Crossing the street has its risks. 
All these statements may be true, but they are beside the point. Instead, 
shouldn’t we be asking whether we are doing everything that we can to 
make the workplace as safe as it can be? Can we do more? And, if we can, 
why have we failed?
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It is one thing for me to make my way to work every morning, safely 
belted in an air conditioned car, later to be entombed in the protective 
shell of a downtown skyscraper office. It is quite another thing to get up 
every day and head back to your workplace in a hotel, hospital, or grocery 
store not knowing whether this may be the day that you get seriously in­
jured, possibly fatally, often for only minimum wage, and with a tattered 
safety net of protections for you and your family.
But before we can make any change in this dynamic, we have to better 
understand the enormity of the problem. Let’s start with the proposition 
that the health and safety of workers in America are matters of social 
justice, which, broadly defined, recognizes the humanity in all and our 
right to equal treatment in society and a fair allocation of its resources. 
All work and workers should be respected, whether the Nobel Prize win­
ner or the day laborer. Yet, as I describe in this book, for most workers in 
the United States the right to a safe and healthy workplace has been made 
difficult to achieve over our country’s history and remains so today in the 
twenty-first century.
I came to the acute awareness of the issue of workplace deaths and 
injuries embarrassingly late, even though I have spent more than thirty 
years as a union-side labor lawyer. Given my background and career 
choice, how did this happen? Well, for one, my focus broadly as a lawyer 
was in representing workers and unions in their organizing efforts and 
in collective bargaining, and on behalf of workers who had been wrong­
fully terminated. While these are kissing cousins to the issue of workplace 
safety, they are far enough removed that even for me, workplace safety 
was, more frequently than not, off my radar screen. Sure, I saw the head­
lines and knew that workers got injured and killed on the job. But those 
workers knew their risks, didn’t they? Workplace death and injury were 
remote events, weren’t they? What I didn’t know is how much I really 
didn’t know. I didn’t really know the breadth and scope of the problem. 
I didn’t really know that workplace safety was a matter of social justice, 
just as important as the right to organize for better wages and to be free 
from discrimination in the workplace, my focus. In the end, for me there 
wasn’t a singular epiphany. I came to my awareness slowly, which led me 
to explore the issue more deeply and, eventually, to this book.
In getting there, I learned from many advocates for worker safety, 
some of whom are colleagues of mine in the labor movement. I learned
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that apart from new laws and better enforcement (just to name a couple 
of obvious reforms), maybe it would help if we—Americans who go to 
work every day—wake up from our collective slumber and demand a 
safer workplace. But I know that social change does not just happen. It 
first requires, as I learned, a real awareness of the problem, an awareness 
that is currently lacking for most of us and, as a result, makes any broad 
debate about workplace safety impossible, drowned out by the noise and 
money of corporate and political interests hostile to change. Numbers and 
statistics are important to a point, and this book is chock full of them. 
However, they also act to anesthetize us from meaningful discussion and 
action, all the while sanitizing the dangerous conditions in which millions 
work in America. American workers have faces, names, families, homes, 
and personal histories. They are more than numbers and statistics in a 
Bureau of Labor Statistics report. Numbers and statistics alone prevent 
us from connecting with workers and their families who suffer real and 
horrific workplace injuries and fatalities. Behind the number 4,836 are 
husbands and wives, sons and daughters, life partners, and a permanent 
wake of grief and loss. And because change cannot occur by distancing 
oneself, a physical immediacy or nearness to the workers and their fami­
lies is required to achieve awareness.
This book is set out in three parts. First, I discuss the problems of 
achieving a safe workplace, including a brief history of workplace safety 
laws in the United States, and the corporate and political forces that stand 
in the way of change. In the end, I offer some ideas and reforms that 
may make workers safer and healthier than they are today, and other 
next steps. Bookended by these sections is the heart of the book, a col­
lection of stories about real workers who were killed and injured in their 
workplaces.
For more than three years, I traveled the country and met with injured 
workers and surviving family members to listen and become proximate.12 
I sat in the living rooms and at the kitchen tables of surviving family 
members, and met with them at coffee shops and at union halls. I listened 
to wives, sons and daughters, and sisters and brothers tell me about their 
losses. I 6at with injured workers, now physically disfigured and broken, 
and listened to how their injuries have unalterably changed their lives. 
For them, in the telling of their stories, all different in the cause of their
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injuries, there was a common refrain that was a miraculous shared senti­
ment in the midst of all the despair. To a person, each and every injured 
worker told me the same deepest wish. And it wasn’t what I expected to 
hear. I expected, as a lawyer, to be told that they wanted to be awarded 
large sums of money for their injuries, their pain and suffering. Some re­
luctantly and, for the most part, unsuccessfully sought legal relief. But 
money was not their wish. Instead, they all told me: “I just want to work.” 
In these most intimate settings, the family survivors and injured workers 
all shared their stories and family pictures, and their tears, fears, anger, 
and hopes. They gave me dog-eared file folders bound by rubber bands 
and stuffed with newspaper clippings, coroner reports, OSHA records, 
and court filings, entrusting to me these precious totems of their suffering. 
We exchanged phone calls and e-mails. I became proximate. I got as near 
as I could. And, finally, I began to understand.
My fondest wish for this book is that their stories will give readers a 
nearness to the experience of these workers and their families. Proximity 
is the beginning of awareness, and a necessary starting point of change.
Some of these workers’ injuries or deaths were several years in the past 
at the time I wrote down their stories, while others are closer in time to the 
present. But all the stories are contemporary in the sense that preventable 
deaths and injuries like those retold in this book occur every day. I wrote 
this book over a three-year period. And during the writing, around four­
teen thousand Americans died preventable deaths from their work. The 
stories are also contemporary in the sense that the grief and suffering 
never completely go away. I was put in contact with the survivors and the 
injured workers from many sources, including from introductions made 
by Tammy Miser and Tonya Ford at the United Support and Memorial 
for Workplace Fatalities, where they do great work bringing attention to 
these tragedies and great comfort to the families. In all cases, the fami­
lies and injured workers entrusted me—a total stranger—with their most 
intimate and painful feelings, and I hope that I have done justice to their 
stories.
For many of the witnesses in this book, the American dream is elusive 
and illusory. Along with the millions like them, the workers in this book 
were only trying to get by, put food on the table and shelter over their 
heads. The workers that you will meet, and workers like them all around
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us, are on the front lines of a war of attrition. But they are not soldiers, 
where injury and death are known, if not acceptable, risks. These Ameri­
cans want only to work and to return home safely at the end of the day. 
The workers in this book are not heroes, except to their loved ones. And 
workers like them are your loved ones, your neighbors, and your friends. 
They are all around us. They are you.
1America Goes to Work
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. 
George Santayana, Th e  Life of Reason
In order to understand where America is today in terms of worker health 
and safety, as well as where it needs to change, it is important to under­
stand the arc of history in the American workplace.
America before the Civil War was largely a rural agrarian society. Amer­
icans lived in isolated communities, tenuously connected to others living 
within a short distance by horse-drawn wagons traveling over poor and 
primitive roads. These Americans, living in isolation, were self-sufficient 
in housing, food, clothing, and other life-sustaining essentials. The farm 
was the primary workplace, staffed by family members. There, almost all 
of one’s needs could be manufactured or grown. The industrial sector, as 
it was until around 1870, consisted mostly of small firms and workshops 
that relied on artisan technology to produce goods for local consumption. 
In communities with a river for a power source, there were small indus­
tries, primarily sawmills and grain mills.
Although there is little reliable information on worker safety from back 
then, the Eden of the pre-industrialized America could be a mean and
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nasty place. Preindustrial workers risked injury from animals, hand tools, 
ladders, and water wheels. But for the most part, worker injuries were 
infrequent and thought to be the fault of the victim, who most often was 
also the “employer.” This all changed with the onset of the Industrial 
Revolution.
The workplace that Americans found at the end of the nineteenth cen­
tury was created in the cauldron of the Industrial Revolution, beginning 
well before the Civil War. Between the Civil War and World War I, and 
fueled by a historic wave of immigration, the United States rapidly in­
tensified its transformation from a rural-based economy to an industrial 
powerhouse, centered in its growing and teeming cities. There is little dis­
pute among historians and economists that the American Industrial Revo­
lution occurred because of the embarrassment of natural resources, the 
emergence and development of American-style manufacturing (including 
the rise of the managerial firm), the growth of the railroads and lowered 
costs of transportation, and the education of the workforce. But none of 
this would have been possible without the more than thirty-three million 
immigrants who, from 1820 to 1920, landed on the shores of America, 
mostly from Europe, seeking the promises of the United States.
In 1880, almost one-half of American workers were farmers. Less than 
15 percent worked in any kind of manufacturing. By 1920, only a mere 
forty years later, the numbers were almost dead even. In this same pe­
riod, manufacturing employment, centralized in growing cities, increased 
from 2.5 million workers to 10 million by 1920. While a portion of this 
workforce was a product of rural-to-urban internal migration, mostly it 
was a result of the flood of external immigration. More than 14 million 
foreign-born workers were the human fuel that powered the American In­
dustrial Revolution. Counting their children during this forty-year period, 
23 million strong, more than one-third of the 105 million Americans in 
1920 were first or second generation. In 1900, three-quarters of the popu­
lation in most large cities were immigrants and their children.1
With this massive influx of immigrant labor into American cities, to­
gether with the power, transportation, and communication revolutions, 
the pieces were all falling in place for the industrial transformation of 
America. Electrical power replaced steam; railroads expanded and con­
nected manufacturing output to markets all over the United States; tele­
phone and telegraph altered the meaning of time and space. The final
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piece was the development of the organizational firm. Large corporations 
were located in urban cities, where the source of cheap labor lived. Giant 
corporations developed and became the prototype of what would become 
a corporate society. American corporations became more formalized, or­
ganized, and integrated.
In 1925, half a century after the end of the Industrial Revolution, Cal­
vin Coolidge surveyed America, whose transformation he had witnessed 
firsthand, and declared: “After all, the chief business of the American 
people is business. They are profoundly concerned with producing, buy­
ing, selling, investing and prospering in the world. I am strongly of the 
opinion that the great majority of people will always find these the mov­
ing impulses of our life.” Some have argued that this statement has often 
been unfairly used by his detractors as evidence of Coolidge’s pro-business 
philosophy. Fair or not, it is an accurate and clear-eyed description of 
the United States as an industrial and economic colossus, embodying the 
world’s richest and most powerful industrial nation. But at what price?
The labor force that arrived on steamships from ports all across the At­
lantic were not necessarily lured by the promise of factory jobs in Ameri­
can cities. They were mostly unskilled laborers, farmer and artisans with 
very little, if any, factory experience. The potato famine in Ireland, and 
crises and privation in other parts of Europe, were the primary causes of 
immigration at the end of the nineteenth century. It was in this period that 
the unskilled immigrant laborer became the “dominant factory manufac­
turing labor force.”2
Fleeing from famine and other adversity, this nascent industrial work­
force, largely unskilled and uneducated, was tossed into the grinder of 
America’s Industrial Revolution. Immigrant workers who in Europe had 
only used small hand tools and animal-powered plows and wagons were 
now operating unguarded mechanical equipment, powered by steam, and 
later electricity, in a high-speed factory setting.
Enormous manufacturing output and productivity were spawned in 
the Industrial Revolution. But so were dangerous working conditions pre­
viously unknown in the history of humankind. And this increased output 
correlated with increased worker injury and death. As American indus­
trial might grew to unprecedented heights, producing material riches for 
its owners and creating a consumer society, the risk of dying or becoming 
seriously maimed in the workplace grew as well. This all occurred within
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a legal and regulatory climate that did not exactly encourage an employer 
to be concerned about the safety of his workers. As a result, American 
production methods were extremely productive, and extremely danger­
ous. Workers initially had little or no say about their safety, and legal 
liability for workplace injuries was usually shifted to the employee under 
assumption of risk or negligence theories, thereby making compensation 
for injuries nonexistent. Injuries were cheap, and workers were replace­
able. There was simply no economic incentive for employers to create a 
safe workplace.
Nowhere was this correlation between increased production and dan­
gerous working conditions as stark as in American coal mines and on 
its railroads, especially compared to their counterparts in Great Britain. 
Some of this can be explained by differences in mining methods, and the 
vast geography of the United States that railroads had to travel. But it is 
undeniable that in the decades immediately before and after the turn of 
the century, American workers were getting injured in these jobs at twice 
the rate of English workers. American mines yielded more coal per worker 
than British mines, but at double the injury rated On the rails, geogra­
phy and low population density turned American railroads into primarily 
freight haulers, a far more dangerous business for workers than hauling 
passenger traffic. “The slaughter of railroad employees began almost as 
soon as the first lines were built.”4 Derailments and collisions were com­
mon and deadly, owing to the lack of signals and the poor condition of 
the track and rail bed. Worse, men had to work between moving train 
cars to couple and uncouple, and to work the brakes. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, railroad workers experienced an extraordinary level 
of risk, with a fatality rate of 3.14 per thousand, and likely much higher 
because of underreporting. By the new century, dubbed the Century of 
Progress, the slaughter continued. In 1907 alone, accidents killed 4,534 
railroad workers.5
Mines and railroads were not the only dangerous workplaces. Garment 
workers, mostly Jews from Eastern Europe, were employed in sweatshops 
up and down the East Coast, but primarily in New York City, the home of 
the garment industry. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth cen­
tury, more people worked in factories in Manhattan than in all the mills 
and plants in Massachusetts. Most of the workers there were employed in 
the garment industry.
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Looking back, in 1791, treasury secretary Alexander Hamilton esti­
mated that more than two-thirds of all clothing in America was home­
made. Little changed over the next fifty years until Elias Howe developed 
the lockstitch sewing machine in the mid- 1840s. This innovation made 
strong, straight seams and made possible the mass production of com­
mercial clothing manufactured in a factory. Courtesy of the Civil War, de­
mand for mass-produced clothing was created as hundreds of thousands 
of soldiers wore the same uniform manufactured and cut to standard 
sizes, differentiated only by blue and gray. The war experience, horrific 
as it was, spelled the death knell of homespun clothing. Such laboriously 
made clothing was eventually replaced by the convenience and quality of 
manufactured clothing, easily purchased off-the-rack in America’s new 
department stores, or through the ubiquitous catalog. The next technolog­
ical change occurred with the invention of the cutter’s knife in the 1870s, 
which enabled a garment worker to cut pieces for identical garments in a 
few strokes.
With the technology in place, the millions of skilled and unskilled im­
migrant workers arriving daily in America from Eastern Europe, Russia, 
and Italy provided the final piece to the rise of the manufacturing garment 
industry.6 By 1900, homemade clothing was a preindustrial relic. In its 
place was a booming garment industry, centered in Manhattan, and de­
pendent on immigrant workers, mostly women, who worked twelve-hour 
days, seven days a week, for a few dollars a day. Garment workers were 
crowded into dark and squalid tenement rooms and hallways on the 
Lower East Side, poorly ventilated, and with locked exits. The tenements 
became known as sweatshops, not so much for their deplorable conditions 
but because of the practice of “sweating” the workers for more work and 
less pay. In addition to receiving low wages for piecework, workers were 
charged for needles and thread and for the use of old sewing machines and 
the privilege to pump the sewing pedal with their feet for hours on end. At 
the end of their shifts, workers were lined up at the single unlocked exit 
and bodily searched, just in case they tried to take home a strand of thread 
or swatch of cloth. Communicable diseases were common for these work­
ers crowded together in tiny rooms with little ventilation and no windows. 
Tuberculosis was known as “the tailors’ disease,” or “the Jewish disease.”
On June 3,1900, in response to the long hours, low pay, and dangerous 
working conditions in the garment industry, eleven delegates representing
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local unions in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Newark formed 
the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU). The local 
unions banding together were the United Brotherhood of Cloak Makers, 
the Skirt Makers Union No. 1 of Greater New York, the Cloak Makers’ 
Protective Union of Philadelphia, the Cloak Makers Union of Baltimore, 
the Cloak Makers’ Union of Brownsville (in Brooklyn), and the Cloak 
Makers’ Union of Newark, New Jersey. They were composed primarily of 
Jewish immigrants who had recently arrived from Eastern Europe, many 
of whom were socialists and had been active trade unionists before com­
ing to America. The ILGWU was granted a charter from the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) on June 22, 1900.
The decade that followed in the garment industry, especially in Man­
hattan, was turbulent and marked by wildcat strikes and other actions, as 
workers struggled for better wages and working conditions. In the sum­
mer of 1909, hundreds of tailors, buttonhole makers, neckwear workers, 
and waist makers from shops all across Manhattan walked off work on 
wildcat strikes. The strikes were short-lived, lasting briefly until the own­
ers gave the workers a modest wage increase.
But in September 1909, events occurred that fundamentally changed 
the relationship between workers and their employers. Workers, mostly 
women, at the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory in Manhattan went out on 
strike. The manufacture of shirtwaists, or blouses, was a rapidly grow­
ing industry. New York had more than five hundred “waist” factories 
operating, employing more than forty thousand workers. The strike began 
when workers at Triangle overwhelmingly voted to join the United He­
brew Trades, an association of Jewish labor unions, rather than continue 
participation in the company-run “benevolent” association. Triangle’s 
owners, Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, once “greenhorns” themselves, 
were now wealthy Manhattan industrialists, living with servants near the 
Hudson River at their in-town mansions. Triangle was a million-dollar 
business, the largest shirtwaist factory in Manhattan, with more than five 
hundred employees. Blanck and Harris responded to the strike by firing 
the union organizers and replacing them with prostitutes. In sympathy, 
other workers at Triangle joined the strike. Doubling down, Blanck and 
Harris hired gang members, who worked for Tammany Hall bosses, to 
threaten and assault the striking women, sometimes with the assistance of 
the New York police.
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After five weeks of being out on strike, shirtwaist workers held a meet­
ing and rally in the Great Hall at Cooper Union. Samuel Gompers, presi­
dent of the AFL, was there endorsing the strike. But it was Clara Lemlich 
who carried the day. Barely five feet tall, Lemlich backed down to no one. 
At age twenty-three, she was a seasoned union organizer. The Triangle 
strike was her third strike in three years. In today’s parlance, she was a 
“salt,” an organizer who, unknown to the employer, gets herself hired 
solely to work inside the workplace for the purpose of organizing the 
workers. She had already survived broken ribs and other injuries in a bru­
tal beating by a hired thug who had twice done time for burglary. On this 
night, following Gompers, she stood at the podium, her curly hair tightly 
pulled back and parted on the right, and forcefully declared in Yiddish, 
“I have no further patience for talk. I move that we go on a general strike! 
Enough is enough!” Genuv iz genuv! A general strike was called across 
the Manhattan garment industry, and workers from other sweatshops, 
again mostly women, walked off their jobs. Known as the “Uprising of the 
Twenty Thousand,” it is believed that more than forty thousand garment 
workers participated in the strike called by Lemlich.
Once again, the owners turned the gangs loose on the strikers. But it 
was public opinion that turned the tide in favor of the workers. The images 
and stories of young women being harassed, threatened, and in some cases 
beaten, by gangs, company guards, and police, helped build public support 
for the strikers. And much of the support came from the unlikeliest of sources. 
Wealthy Manhattan women, many of whom undoubtedly owned the dresses 
painstakingly manufactured by the strikers, became their biggest supporters. 
These progressive socialites, who themselves were struggling for the rights of 
women’s suffrage, found common cause with the immigrant women strikers. 
J. P. Morgan’s daughter Anne announced in the New York Times her support 
for the strikers by joining the Women’s Trade Union League:
If we come to fully recognize these conditions we can’t live our own lives 
without doing something to help them, bringing them at least the support of 
public opinion. We can see from the general trade conditions how difficult 
it must be for these girls to get along. Of course, the consumer must be pro­
tected, but when you hear of a woman who presses forty dozen skirts for $8 a 
week something must be very wrong. And fifty-two hours a week seems little 
enough to ask. . . . These conditions are terrible, and the girls must be helped 
to organize . . . and if public opinion is on their side they will be able to do it.7
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Another supporter of the strike was Alva Vanderbilt Belmont, whose 
first husband was the grandson of Cornelius Vanderbilt. She divorced 
Vanderbilt as an adulterer and married August Belmont, whose father 
was a Jewish investment banker for the Rothschild family.8 His mother 
was the daughter of Commodore Matthew Perry. By her birth and social 
status, she seemed the most unlikely benefactor of immigrant women gar­
ment workers. But after August Belmont died suddenly, Alva used her 
considerable wealth in support of women’s and workers’ rights, including 
financial support for the Women’s Trade Union League. She also kept the 
socialist newspaper The Masses from bankruptcy. And in the “Uprising of 
Twenty Thousand,” she gave considerable financial support to the strik­
ers, including paying the bail of arrested strikers.9 Anne Morgan, Alva 
Belmont, and others like them were bound together with Clara Lemlich, 
the small, skinny Jewish girl from the Ukraine. The right to vote, and the 
right to better working conditions and pay, were now united.
Their support proved pivotal, as the shirtwaist companies bowed to 
public pressure and agreed in early 1910 to negotiations and arbitration 
with the ILGWU. An agreement was reached on February 13, 1910, limit­
ing the workweek to only fifty-two hours, while giving workers four paid 
holidays. In addition, employers were required to provide all the tools and 
materials necessary for the work, instead of charging workers for needles 
and thread. However, not all shirtwaist companies signed the agreement. 
Most notably, Blanck and Harris at Triangle did not.10 Their refusal to 
move with the progressive tide would prove fatal to 146 of their workers 
a little more than twelve months later.
But, before that, there was more unrest. On July 7, 1910, more than 
sixty thousand cloak makers, this time mostly men, went on strike, af­
fecting around eighteen hundred shops and stores across the nation." 
With public opinion still on the workers’ side, pressure to settle came 
from a new source—retail store owners led by Abraham Lincoln Filene, 
owner of the Boston-based Filene’s. Filene, born of German-Jewish immi­
grant parents ten days before his namesake was assassinated, was unusual 
among the wealthy businessman of his time. He was an early supporter of 
women’s suffrage, and much later bucked the trend of his business class 
and supported Roosevelt’s New Deal. He was what some might call an en­
lightened capitalist. Although his strong personal beliefs guided many of 
the decisions in his life, he also had an economic self-interest in resolving
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the cloak makers’ strike: he sold the coats and garments that they made, 
and without new merchandise arriving in his stores, his sales would fall 
off. So he would lead the effort to settle the strike, and sought the help of 
another Jewish Bostonian. He hired lawyer Louis Brandeis to negotiate 
and mediate a settlement.
Brandeis, born in Louisville, Kentucky, started his first law practice 
in Boston, after attending Harvard Law School, where he graduated first 
in his class. Graduating number two at Harvard was his partner, Samuel 
Warren. Brandeis soon became known as the “people’s lawyer” for the 
many public-interest cases he handled, often for no fee. He was a brilliant 
lawyer and tactician, and later a United States Supreme Court justice. 
Filene also reached out to Meyer Bloomfield, a prominent Boston social 
worker and industrial reformer. Teamed with Brandeis, they were the per­
fect delegates for Filene to navigate the ever-widening gap between the 
cloak makers’ manufacturers, who formed a protective association, and 
the striking workers and their union, the ILGWU.
Beginning in late July 1910, Brandeis and Bloomfield mediated and 
negotiated between the manufacturers and their corporate lawyer, Julius 
Cohen, and the union and its leaders. Brandeis attempted to craft a com­
promise, which early on the union had rejected and walked away from. 
This proved to be a tactical mistake, as for the first time public opinion 
began to turn against the union and the strikers, with the New York 
Times leading the way, writing that the workers were greedy and selfish. 
This setback made it harder for Brandeis to find a settlement. In the end, 
and after Cohen moved the strike into the courtroom, where he obtained 
an injunction against the ILGWU, a deal was reached on September 2. 
Dubbed the “Protocols of Peace,” the agreement ushered in a new sys­
tem of industrial relations. It was a watershed event in labor relations. 
It contained the common terms found in a labor contract today, cover­
ing wages, hours, and other working conditions, and was far better than 
most contracts of the day. Most important, and lasting into today, the 
protocols codified Brandeis’s vision of industrial peace that would ban 
all strikes and lockouts during the term of an agreement, and replace 
strife with a grievance and arbitration procedure. Disputes would be re­
solved in arbitration and not on the streets. Finally, the protocols created 
the “preferential shop,” which was, for all practical purposes, a closed 
union shop.
Chapter One
As 1910 came to a close, and with nearly 90 percent of all cloak mak­
ers now in the union and covered by the protocols, the manufacturers 
believed that the days of wildcat strikes and labor unrest were over. They 
could go back to making blouses and coats and other garments for the 
new American consumer, who was buying manufactured clothing at the 
rate of $1.3 billion in sales per year. In today’s dollars, they sold $23 bil­
lion through stores like Filene’s and in Sears, Roebuck catalogs.12 Abra­
ham Lincoln Filene, with Brandeis and Bloomfield, believed that they had 
created a template for industrial relations, built on mutual respect ben­
efiting both capital and labor. Their peace, however, lasted only a short 
time. The revolution in industrial relations that the workers’ strikes of 
1909-1910 begat would continue following the Triangle fire, but at the 
cost of 146 lives.
2The Torch That Lighted Up the 
Industrial Scene
The Triangle Shirtwaist Company was located on the corner of Greene 
Street and Washington Place, just to the east of Washington Square, in the 
heart of Greenwich Village. Blanck and Harris, the “Shirtwaist Kings,” 
moved their growing business from the dank tenements of Wooster Street 
to a modern, ten-story framed skyscraper with more than ninety thousand 
square feet of loft space to lease. The Asch Building was typical of the sky­
scrapers rising up all over Manhattan. In the first decade of the twenti­
eth century, more than eight hundred new skyscrapers were added to the 
Manhattan skyline, many housing new loft factories.1 The business model 
was simple. On the same-size footprint that the squalid tenement sweat­
shops occupied, modern factories boasting thousands of square feet rose 
one on top of the other. The home of commerce was going vertical.
Triangle leased the top three floors of the Asch Building. The added 
space was not for the benefit of the existing workforce. Instead, more 
workers were crowded into the new space. More of them were working 
in long rows of electric sewing machines and presses, all connected to a
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single power source, where they churned out more work, more waists, 
and all at faster speeds. For Blanck and Harris, and others like them, 
the high-rise factories enabled them to have all their workers under one 
roof. All their operations—production, shipping, and sales—were also 
now under one roof. The efficiencies of these modern factories allowed 
them to expand their product lines and make more garments than ever 
before. And, at Triangle, the “greenhorns” from Russia would make even 
more money than they ever imagined. In March 1911, all housed in the 
Asch Building, the Triangle empire was at its zenith. It was also ten floors 
above the streets of Manhattan, far above where the New York firefight­
ing equipment could reach.
March 25, 1911, was by all accounts a beautiful spring day in New 
York. By late that Saturday afternoon, New Yorkers were out and about 
enjoying the weather around leafy Washington Square. At around 4:30 
p.m., workers at Triangle were getting ready to go home. It has never 
been definitively determined how many workers were at Triangle that day. 
There were always some who were sick, while others chose to observe the 
Sabbath at home, but at the cost of a day’s pay. Still, with sales people, 
office clerks, and management, including Harris and Blanck, and Blanck’s 
young daughter Mildred, there were nearly five hundred souls crowded 
into floors eight through ten that day.
Production was on the eighth and ninth floors, while pressing, pack­
ing, shipping, and the executive offices were housed at the top, on floor 
ten. On floor eight, around 150 workers cut and sewed shirtwaists, all 
stationed at rows of long wooden tables. The cutting tables at Triangle 
were designed with boards surrounding the table legs, effectively creating 
wooden bins into which the cutters would toss cotton scraps and the tis­
sue paper from paper patterns that hung on wires above the tables. Cut­
ters and sewers would assemble anywhere from ten to twelve thousand 
shirtwaists each week, which in turn created a highly flammable mix of 
thousands of pounds of tissue paper and fabric scrap jammed into the 
wooden bins. The cotton fabric, which was more flammable than even the 
tissue paper, created a “virtual firebomb” on the eighth floor. The blaze 
was likely ignited by a still lit cigarette or match, carelessly tossed into a 
wooden bin.
Floor nine housed 278 sewing machines. Again, it is unknown exactly 
how many workers, mostly women, were at work that day. But, together
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with examiners, foremen, and bookkeepers, the best guess is that there 
were 250 employees on the ninth floor.
It was estimated that on the top floor of the Asch Building, on March 25, 
there were around seventy persons. Getting off the elevator on the tenth 
floor, one had to pass the reception area and switchboard. Beyond were 
the large offices of Blanck and Harris, looking down onto Washington 
Place through arched windows. Beyond the offices was a showroom 
where department store buyers and Triangle salesmen gathered to strike 
their deals. Finally, there were the pressing, packing, and shipping depart­
ments. The irons used to press the finished garments were connected by a 
web of tubing that supplied pressurized gas to heat them.
The exits from floors eight and nine were small, allowing only one per­
son at a time to pass through a wooden partition. There, a guard would 
inspect the workers’ handbags to make sure they were not stealing pieces 
of cloth. Still worse, the doors opened into, and not out from, the loft 
space. This was a fatal design flaw, as later, when jammed with bodies 
trying to escape, the exits were all but impassable.
From 4:45 p.m., when the first employee on floor eight yelled fire, and 
alarm box 289 was pulled, it took less than fifteen minutes for nearly 146 
lives to perish in a firestorm. A few died later of their injuries. In that time, 
firefighters from New York engine companies converged onto the corner 
of Greene and Washington, including the tallest fire ladder from Hook 
and Ladder No. 20, but which still fell short of reaching the workers by 
some thirty feet. Lugging hundreds of feet of fire hose with them into the 
inferno, firemen bravely climbed the staircase as frenzied workers from 
the eighth floor fled past them to safety. Workers on floor nine were not 
so lucky. The exit doors were locked, or jammed, with the press of falling 
bodies. As many as ninety workers were hopelessly trapped on that floor.
At 4:50 p.m., the first worker jumped from the blaze on floor nine, 
falling to death on the pavement below. Soon, safety nets were deployed 
to catch the falling bodies, human missiles speeding more than one hun­
dred feet down into the nets. Some of the bodies were on fire as they 
fell. A reporter on the scene wrote about “a new sound—a more horrible 
sound than description can picture. It was the thud of a speeding, liv­
ing body on a stone side walk.” Nonetheless, and probably emboldened 
by the nets, more workers jumped to their deaths, some two at a time, 
holding on to each other. Others struggled to remain vertical on the way
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down, believing that landing feet first might somehow save them. Three 
minutes later, the firemen stopped using the nets, and still the bodies fell, 
until the last worker jumped at 4:57 p.m. She was a woman who fell to 
her death only after becoming impaled on a hook holding up a sign on 
the side of the building. It is believed that in this brief time span, fifty-four 
workers jumped, choosing death from the fall rather than from the fire. 
This toll was in addition to around twenty-four workers who fell to their 
deaths while trying to flee by the fire escape, which was too small and too 
narrow for hundreds of workers to traverse in a fire. Still others tried to 
escape down the elevator shafts, burning the skin off their hands as they 
slid down the elevator cable before losing their grip and falling to their 
deaths. Eventually, nineteen bodies were recovered from atop the elevator 
car, the weight of which prevented the elevator from climbing to rescue 
more trapped workers.
The fire was finally contained on the top three floors by 5:15 p.m. 
In the end, 146 employees of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, mostly all 
women, perished in less than thirty minutes. Compounding the tragedy, 
there was never a reliable list of the victims, with many bodies burned be­
yond recognition. Still, many more were lucky enough to survive, includ­
ing Blanck and Harris and others from the tenth floor who found refuge 
on the rooftop.
The fire did not have to happen. The Triangle fire occurred at a time 
when firewalls, fire doors and stairs, and automatic sprinklers had been 
commonplace in cotton mills since the 1880s. But although many cotton 
mill owners implemented fire safety measures because the cost of fires was 
too expensive, the garment industry had a different take on the financial 
efficacy of factory fires.
Four days after the fire, more than a half million New Yorkers lined 
the streets of Manhattan and marched in a funeral parade for the Triangle 
victims. Politicians and the press tried to assess blame for the fire. It was 
the fault of the building owner, the New York building department for 
allowing too-tall buildings with little thought for fire safety, and even the 
vaunted fire department. On April 12, just three short weeks after the 
fire, the politically ambitious district attorney, Charles Whitman, indicted 
Blanck and Harris for manslaughter. Whitman and the grand jury charged 
that the doors on the ninth floor were locked when the fire erupted. 
Blanck and Harris were arrested while at work at their new factory. For
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their defense, they hired Max Steuer, a former garment worker, who was 
known at the time as the greatest trial lawyer in America. On Decem­
ber 27, after nearly three weeks of trial and dozens of survivor witnesses, 
the jury acquitted Blanck and Harris on all counts after only a couple of 
hours of deliberations. The jury of twelve was made up of twelve business­
men, including a shirtwaist manufacturer. Blanck and Harris escaped the 
angry crowds camped outside the courtroom through the prisoner’s exit.
After the fire, the upward trajectory of the Shirtwaist Kings collapsed. 
While they collected thousands of dollars from insurance, above the value 
of the inventory and machine losses, they were also forced to defend many 
civil lawsuits from the families of the victims. They turned to Steuer, who 
again successfully defended them from the civil claims. Blanck and Harris 
were never found guilty in the civil trials, and never paid a penny to the 
families. Yet they struggled to keep Triangle afloat. By 1918, the Triangle 
Shirtwaist Company was no more.
In terms of loss of human life, there were worse industrial accidents at 
the time of the Triangle fire. In 1908, 354 coal miners perished in the mines 
of West Virginia. But garment workers in Manhattan factories were not 
miners. They were cutting and sewing clothing in a modern office build­
ing. Although the work was grueling and the conditions were deplorable 
in many of the shops, working in a garment factory in Manhattan was not 
a known risk. The public response to this game changing event was swift 
and, once again, led by progressive forces from among New York’s social 
elites. They lobbied at the capital in Albany, finding political support from 
Robert Wagner, a future United States senator, and A1 Smith, a future gov­
ernor and a presidential candidate in 1928. Together, they proposed leg­
islation that created the Factory Investigating Commission. It was signed 
into law on June 30, 1911, just three months after the Triangle fire.2
The commission was empowered “to investigate the conditions under 
which manufacturing is carried on.” Originally authorized for only one 
year, the commission lasted for four years. In addition to Wagner and 
Smith, the AFL president Samuel Gompers was a powerful member. Fran­
ces Perkins, who was a young Columbia graduate student from Boston 
when she heard the alarms for the Triangle fire while drinking tea nearby, 
was a frequent witness before the commission and a noted expert on 
workers’ health and safety.5 She was later appointed by Franklin Roo­
sevelt as his secretary of labor, the first woman to hold a cabinet position.
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In its first two years, the commission held fifty-nine public hearings 
throughout the state, with 472 witnesses providing sworn testimony on 
the working conditions of men and women in New York. Their testimony 
filled more than seven thousand pages of public records. The commission 
staff investigated conditions at 3,385 workplaces, including 359 chemical 
plants, which in 1912 made up 28 percent of all production in the United 
States. In the end, the commission’s report in 1912 concluded that “health 
is the principal asset of the working man and working woman” and that 
it is up to the government to do everything in its power to protect the 
health and safety of American workers. Toward that end, the commission 
drafted twenty-six bills to protect workers’ health and safety. From 1912 
to 1914, thirteen of seventeen bills it proposed were enacted into law 
by the New York legislature. The New York commission was the most 
important investigative body in the United States up to then.4 But it was 
not the only one. As Frances Perkins later noted, the Triangle fire was the 
“torch that lighted up the industrial scene.”5
In May 1911, Wisconsin became the first state to enact workers’ com­
pensation laws.6 Before the year was out, nine more states passed workers’ 
compensation laws. At the end of 1913, eleven more states created work­
ers’ compensation systems. By 1921, only a decade after the Triangle fire, 
forty-six jurisdictions had workers’ compensation laws. The incentive for 
such laws came in large part from employers. Up until then, workers could 
sue for damages in civil courts, but success was far from guaranteed. Ini­
tially, it was difficult to persuade a jury to lay blame for workers’ injuries 
on the employers, who time and again successfully asserted contributory 
negligence and assumption-of-risk defenses, which shifted liability and re­
sponsibility to the worker. But as public opinion began to move against 
employers and in favor of injured workers, large jury awards became more 
frequent, and workers’ compensation was born. A pooled insurance sys­
tem financed by employer premiums and run by the state, and which sub­
stituted a fixed compensation system for the vagaries of jury awards, was 
in the end in the employers’ best economic interests. Organized labor at 
first opposed workers’ compensation as depriving workers of access to the 
civil courts to sue for unlimited damages. However, led by Gompers, labor 
eventually threw its support behind workers’ compensation in 1909.
In addition to workers’ compensation, other Progressive Era reforms 
included the idea of state industrial commissions enforcing worker health
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and safety laws. Conceived and promoted by John R. Commons, a pro­
fessor at the University of Wisconsin, such commissions could establish 
regulations and guidelines by administrative rule making, without having 
to seek a legislative imprimatur every time health and safety rules needed 
to be implemented or changed. It took the politics out of workers’ health 
and safety and put the latter into the hands of commissions with special­
ized expertise to develop rules and guidelines. The commission guidelines 
would make factory inspections clearer and more reliable for both em­
ployers and workers. Commons and his students drafted the Wisconsin 
Safe Place Statute of 1911, known as the “Wisconsin idea.” When en­
acted, it created the first modern industrial commission with rule-making 
power. By 1936, administrative rule making would become the principal 
way states regulated worker health and safety. Yet the “Wisconsin idea” 
did not take hold as national legislation until 1970 and the act establish­
ing the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
Finally, the Progressive Era produced the first investigations and reports 
on occupational diseases. The connection between work and workers’ dis­
eases had been widely known for decades. This was particularly true in 
New England textile mills, where poor ventilation and the inhalation of 
cotton dust led to chronic worker respiratory illnesses, including tubercu­
losis, while workers were also afflicted with skin diseases from the humid 
heat, deafness from the noise of weaving machines, and even cancers from 
carcinogenic lubricants. But it was not until 1911, when the State of Il­
linois published the results of a special occupational disease commission, 
that public awareness grew. Led by researchers and scientists from the 
University of Chicago, this commission identified thirty toxic substances 
commonly found in the workplace, including mercury, arsenic, and lead. 
The report’s section on lead was the most damning, finding lead poison­
ing among workers in a wide range of industries, including smelting and 
refining, painting, printing, and battery making. In one enamel plant, the 
commission found 92 out of 148 workers “leaded.” A version of the com­
mission’s recommendations became law in 1911, as the Illinois Occupa­
tional Disease Act, although it was watered down by business lobbying.
These Progressive Era reforms, in response to intensive industrializa­
tion, labor strife, and horrific worker deaths and injuries, were not with­
out push-back from business interests and their politicians. In New York, 
just as the Factory Investigating Commission was experiencing its greatest
